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"THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
FROM  THE  FIRST  ENLARGEMENT  TO  THE  SECOND" 
I  chose  the  title of  this  lecture with  some  deliberation 
because  I  would  like  to present  the  problems  of Europe  to  you 
this  evening  in the  perspective  of  two  enlargements.  The  first 
enlargement  in  1973  to  the  north  and west  of  the  original  Six 
included  the  United  Kingdom.  That  has  influenced  the  Community's 
development  and the role  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  Europe.  The 
second  enlargement will  be  to  the  south  and it will  embrace 
three new  democracies  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  first 
enlargement has, changed,  the  second will  change  the  Community. 
The  question  is  in which  direction we  want  it to  go~  The 
Community  is  changing  not  oniy  in  the  content  of its policies, 
but  also  in its institutional  arrangements.  The  two  react 
one  on  the  other.  Conventional  ideas  about  Europe  are  becoming 
a  little worn;  the:institutions  a  little frayed;  and  the  terms 
of discussion about  both  are  shifting.  These  changes  are,  it 
seems  to  me,  too  often misunderstood  in Britain,  and  one  of  my 
objectives  this  evening  is  to  try to  do  something  to  put  this 
right. 
/First,  the  Communi'Y - 2  - ·- -
First,  the  Community,as  a  political and  administrative 
organisation,  is at  a  different stage  in its development 
from  the Member  States.  The  Member  States  themselves  do 
indeed continue  to  change  but  for  the mpst  part  the political 
shape  they present  today  has  been  formed  at  the  very  latest 
by  the  second half of the nineteenth century.  However  important 
or politically contentious  movements  towards  devolution  may  be, 
the habits  and  traditions which  govern  the  conduct  of public 
life today  have  been  acquired  over  a  hundred  or more  years. 
The  Community  by  contrast  has  had  only  just over  twenty years 
to forge  a  personality by  working  together  on  day-to-day 
problems,  and  by  being  confronted with difficulties which  have 
to  be  overcome  by  common  action. 
Th~ implications  of  the  Community's  relative  youth  are 
too often  forgottn  by  its critics.  Particularly  in  the 
three new  members,  there  is  a  tendency  to  look  on  the  Community  as 
rigid,  inflexible,  and monolithic,  held fast  in  the  iron  bands 
of its rules  and  regulations.  There  are  perhaps  in  the  United 
Kingdom  three  reasons  for  this.  First,  inevitably,  on  an 
issue which  remained  at thebeari  of British political argument 
for  two  decades,  a  view hostile  to membership  took  delight  in 
and made  play  of  the  Community's  so-called rigidity.  Second, 
with an  Anglo-Saxon  innate dislike  o£  written constitutions  - .  . 
something which  I  am  glad to  say we  are  beginning  to  outgrow  -
we  were  suspicious  of  a  Community  settled in the  law  of  the 
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Comr:uni ty,  and  partic~lar!y the 
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sought  to  proceed  from  the  particular  on  the ·basis  of  law  rat~er 
than  the general  on .the basis  of politics,  the  accumulated 
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impression can  be  one  of layers  of detailed directives  and  little 
else.  These  opinions,  or  this  approach  to  opinion,  are  not 
so widespread  in  the  original members,  where  they  have  a  ]onger 
experience  of  the  realities  of  Community  life and,  in  some, 
different traditions  of public  law.  But  this  is not  the 
central point.  Because it is  a  young  organism the  Community's 
rigidities,  where  they  are  exist,  are  temporary,  not 
permanently sclerotic.  The  Community  still has  a  long. way  to 
go  to suffer the  hardening  of  old  age.  The  opportunities  for 
influencing  the  course  of its development  are  there  to  be 
taken,  and  ~,he  issues  involved  are  really much  bigger  than  the 
critical arguments  advanced. 
If I  began  with  this  question  of  the  perception of  the 
Community,  I  should  like  then  to  deal  with  some  of the 
criticisms which  the  Community  has  to  face,  especially  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  then  compare  those  with  the  major  issues  of 
policy we  have  to  face.  I  will  return at  the  end  to  the 
consequences  I  draw  from  the  way  we  should  see  ourselves  in 
Europe. 
The  first  enlagement  to  include  Britain has  already 
stimulated change.  The  way  the  Community  has  gone  since 
January  1973  may  be  good  or  bad,  but  it· is  a  course  charted 
by  nine  members,  not  by  six.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
the  history of  the  Community  would  have  been  very  di~ferent if 
.. 
enlargement  had  not  taken place.  Merely  by  the  play of the 
Community  institutions,  the  points  of view,  and  needs  antl  the 
essential interests  of  the  new  members  have  contribut~d to  the 
determining  of  Community  action.  It would  indeed  be  a  sorry 
confession  for  any  government  to admit  that after five  years  of 
/membership \ 
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membership  ofthaCommunity- a  quarter of  the  Community's  lifetime-
they  had  been  unable  to make  their voice  heard  in its councils. 
That  is certainly not  the  case.  But  I  sometimes  wonder  whether 
that is  clearly enough  seen  here  in Britain and  whether  the 
often shrill and  ill-informed  judgements  which  are  made  about  the 
Community  fail  to  reflect for  public  opinion generally  the  way 
in which  it can play its part  in  the  Council  of Ministers. 
Of  course  I  wish  that  the picture of  the  good  news  of Britain 
in Europe  was  portrayed  as  often  as  the  bad,  but  this  is not 
the  only  problem,  nor  the  mainspring  of misunderstanding. 
I  believe  that  lies  in  a  misconception  about  the nature  of  the 
Community,  the  issues  before it, and  the  terms  of  the  debate 
about  its future. 
I  said that  the  Community,  as  an  administrative  and 
political  organisation~ was  at  a  completely different  stage  in 
its  development  than were  the  Member  States.  I. did not  by 
that mean  to  imply  that  the  Community  was  the  same  kind  of 
political animal  as  the  Member  States.  That  is  thought  to  be 
one  of the  11idees-fixes"  of Europeans;  but it is  a  myth,  and 
--
much  more  a  myth  propagated  by  those  hostile  to  the 
Community  than  those  who  work  for  its success.  The  myth 
is  that  the  Community  is  in  some  way  a  rival  or  even  a  potential 
enemy,_rather  in  the  way  that  France and  England  glared at 
each  other across  the  Channel  for  most  of  the  eighteenth century, 
and  much  of  the  nineteenth  century  too.  This  is  not,  and  cannot 
be,  the  case.  The  United  Kingdom  is  one  of  the 
members  of  the  Communit~  a  part  of  the  Communitv.  To  think  of  the 
Community  as  a  rival  is  a  logical  contradiction.  _A  family  cannot 
be  a  rival ''to  one  o::  its ·members.  But  a  member,  if it erects  a 
false  barrier of alienation may  easily  damage  its  ?Wn  interests. 
/Some  British politicians ·0 
Some  British politicians who  concern  themselves  with 
Community  affairs  often say,  or  imply,  that an  unwillingness 
on  theiri part  to  accept or compromise with proposals  that have 
the blessing of  OLher  Member  States  is no  more  than  the  normal 
mechanism  of  the  way  in which  the  Community  should operate, 
and  that_in so  doing  they  are  behaving  no  differently from, 
for.example,  the  French.  Let  me  make  two  points.  First, 
every national  government  is expected  in the  Council  of 
Ministers  to  defend its national  interest:  this  is not  news; 
it is  normal;  it is not virtuous,  it is necessary.  Second, 
it is  accepted  by  all,  save perhaps  the British,  that  this 
is  a  position of practice not principle.  It is a.t this 
point  that  the  analogy with  France,  particularly the  France  of 
General  de  Gaulle,  is  f~lse .and unhistorical.  De  Gaulle  had  a 
clear vision  of Europe, .of  its existence,  history,  potency  and 
' 
purpose.  His  'Europe  des  Patries'  assumed  and  did not  deny 
a  Community  of  interest among  the nation states who  made  up  the 
Community.  Many  did not 
agree with his  concept  of Europe,  but no  one  doubted  that it 
existed.  In  the  case  of  Br~tain,  on  the  other hand,  there  is 
sometimes-a  doubt  as  to whether  we  have  any  concept  of  Europe 
at all.  The  problem with British Gaullism,  if I  may  pick up  a 
frequently  used 
rnis leauing. but;  te-rm~, ,  is  that it may  lead  the British in Europe 
into ptecisely the· trap that  those  who  fought  for  our  entry 
were  determined  to  avoid:  acceptance  of membership  - fortun~tely 
that  argument  is  dead  - but without  a  clear conception of 
the  Community,  or its purpose. 
/Inevitably the Ine~i~~bly the  Community·means  different  things  to 
~d:ifferent people;  indeed,  each  one  of us,  when  trying  to 
'fonn  a  picture of  the  Community,  puts  into it something".of his 
own  preconceptions,  hopes  and  even  fears.  This  is normal. 
Political entities·have  an  existence of their own  and  an 
existence  in the  minds  of their citizens.  When  they  are  no  longer 
believed in empires  fall.  But  sometimes  pictures are distorted. 
I  have  the  impression  that  the  image  many  people  in  this  country 
have  made  Eor  themselves  of  the  Community  does  not really 
correspond to what  we  in Brussels  do  or are  trying  to do.  And 
by  usin.g  the word· Brussels  I  include  the nine  Member  States 
as well  as  the  Commission.  The  Commission  is  not  fighting 
·with nine  recalcitrant governments  to  turn  the  Community  into 
-a  superstate.  We  do  not  believe  that decisions  taken  in 
:Brussels  are ipso facto better than  those  made  in national 
' 
capitals.  We  do  not  want  to  submerge  national  identities  in 
~ milk-and-water  - or perhaps  in view  o£  mountains  and  lakes  -
I  should say a  milk  and wine  Community. 
Let  me,  in this  context,· take  up  one  of  the  common 
x;riticisms  of  the  Community.- · First,  despite  views  to  the  contrary, 
the  Communi.t;.y's  institutions  can  change  and  develop  in line 
wJ:th  developments  in policy.  The  Community  institutions  do  not, 
'l:ike youthful  dinosaurs,  lumber  around  in  an  unchanging  and 
:in£lexible  environment.  Over  the years  the  machinery  through 
which  decisions  have _been  taken  and policy formulated  has  been 
adapted  as  closely as  possible  to ·the  needs  of those  who  are 
'involved  in the  taking of dec is  ions.  Of  course,  development  has 
always  taken place  on  the  basis  laid down  by  the  Treaties,  and 
ijlB!rt:i.caJ;l:GT'1y  by  the Treaty of  Rome  which  founded  the  Economic 
Community,,  ·bttt con:e  :must  not  think that the Treaties  hold  the 
/answer answer  to every institutional problem which  may  arise.  They 
are not,  and  by  their very nature  they  cannot  be,  model 
constitutions.  Their  contents  are  disparate.  Some  provisions 
look  like  laws,  and  are directly applied  as  such.  Others 
provide  a  framework  within which  policies  can  be  worked  out. 
Others  again,  like  the  institutional provisions,  set up  bcdies 
which  over  the years  develop  their own  style of work,  but 
whose  responsibilities  and  functions  remain  clear.  The 
institutional balance  is  adjusted  from  time  to  time.  It was 
adjusted in the  creation of the  European  Council  for  example, 
the  thrice-yearly meetings  of the  heads  of  Government  and  the 
President of the  Commission.  Direct elections  to  the 
Parliament will make  a  different adjustment at  least in giving 
that body  a  greater moral  authority  and  therefore  a  better base 
for democratic  accountability. 
The  formal  process  of decision  is  reasonably well  know. 
The  Commission  proposes;  the  Council  disposes.  But  the 
Commiss)bn  does  not,despite  occasional  rumours  to  the  contrary, 
;•·  ...  , 
make  its proposals  out  of  the  blue.  They  are  the  fruit  of  long 
and  sometimes  difficult disctisstons  with  interested parties, 
. 
including experts  from  the Member  States.  This  lengthy 
process  of consultation is  indeed  one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
Commission  is  sometime.s  criticised for  delay  in presenting its 
proposals.  Once  the  Commission  has  made  .its proposal,  it is 
tre~Council which  decides.  This  is  that  supreme  decision-making 
organ  in  the  Community.  Without  its  approval,  no  important 
policy decision  can  be  taken.  And  it is here  at this  stage 
of discussion  that  a  curious  schizophrenia  can  develop  which  affects 
critics of  the  Community.  You  will  be  told  "Brussels will 
/decide; 0' 
' 
decide;  th•e  power  is  out  o~ our  hands";  the  bureaucracy  is 
at worlt  and national  sovereignty  is being  impaired.  But  what 
ill fact  hmppens  is that the  Council,  composed of nine ·Ministers 
from  governments  which  have  been  elected to offLce  in the 
member  States,  are presenting  and  arguing  through  their national 
views  of  the  proposals  we  have put  forward.  This  is  a  democratic 
and  accountable  process,  and  more  than  in  any  national political 
f;o~rum of w1hich  I  have had experience,  it is  an  open  process. 
Second,  t"h:e.re  is  the  charge  that the  Community  is 
excessively  ~ureaucratic.  In its simplest  form,  as  an  attack 
91t  t:hle_  size  o-f  the  Commission,  it is easily  answered.  In  1977 
th•ere  were  jta.st  ove.r  ten  .. and  a  half thousand  Commission staff, 
compared  to about  tw,o  million central  gov_ernment  civil servants 
i1t  t:h•e  United  Kin-g-dom  and  33.0,000  in Ireland.  Over  the  last 
tltree  years  the  United  King  dow  civil service  has  grown  at  an 
annual  avera~ge of  7%,  while  the  Commission  - from  a  vastly 
lower  base,  and  in  an  expanding  field::..  has  grown  by  3.8%. 
Mtrreover,  within  the  Commission,  under half  (5,262)  are 
administrative civil servants,  as  they  would  be  conceived  in 
Brit·a:ln.  3·rr%  of  the  staff are  translators  and  interpreters, 
a:n_,d'  the  t"e-st  en)ga:ged  on  scientific res,earch.  In short,  the 
numbers  are  tiny~  I  therefore-find it hard  to  see  the  sense  of 
this charge.  Moreover,  as  I  have  sai_d  it is certainly more  open 
t:han.  any  national  administration  I  have  known. 
But  often th:e  charge  of bureaucracy  is more  subtle. 
1lQ.e  argument  run:s  as· follows:·  all right,  we  accept  that  the 
s:,iz;e  of the  .. Gommis$ion  is  not  overblown,  but it produces  so  many 
mino;r  ].l'r'Qpll!sals,  especially  on  harmonisation,  that  '.hey  could 
/only  have only  have  come  out  of  a  politically insensitive  and  over-
bureaucratic  machin~.  This  brings  one  directly to  the 
third point  that this  small  number  of Eurocrats  a  re simply  out 
to standardise,  homogenise  and  interfere. 
This subject,  technically described as  the 
aproximation  of  laws  rather than harmonisation,  is,  of its 
nature,  instrumental.  It serves  to  make  the  common  market  work 
and  thus  to  realise the  objectives  of  the Treaty set out  in 
and  importance  aspect  of 
Article z.·  The  maintenance/of  the  common  market  ./  the  Community 
is essential.  Historically it underpinned  the  economic  success 
of  th~ original six;  the  c6ntinued  assurance  of  the  strength 
of the  common  market  is  now  necessary  to  the  recovery  of 
European  industry.  But  just as  the  effects  of a  successful 
market  if unrestrained and  adjusted by  regional  and  social  .  .  ' 
policies  can  be  devisive,  so  obviously  can  be  an  apparently 
un-thinking  pursuit  of  the  approximation  of  laws.  I  think 
there are  three ways  in which  we  can  and· are  beginning  to 
re-examine  our  . appr_oach  in this  field. 
·-. 
First,  for  most  of  us  uniformity  is undesirable;  we 
·- . 
cherish our differences.  Our  principle_should therefore 
be  to  eliminate  differences  not  to  the· fullest  extent  possible 
only 
butlto~the extent necessary.  F6r  exampl~, if there  are 
severa~ methods  by  which  an  objective· can_be  achieved  then  the 
choice should be  left open.  to  individual Member  St~tes. 
Second,  we  must  make  sure  that_ our  proposals  in this 
area are  seen  to have  been  fully  prepared  and  discussed. 
The  Commission  should not  and will  not  undermine  its  impoitant 
right of initiative in  the  institutional balance  of the 
Community,  but it should. be  ready  to  make  clear to  the outside 
I 
l world  theradvice  on  which it may  have  based its proposals. 
There  is  already  a  wide  range  of  consultation but it is not 
a;lways  made  apparent.  We  should be  prepared  to  consider more 
r~gularly the  production of green discussion- papers  (as  we  did 
on  worker.  participation)  and public hearings  of policy  areas 
(as  we  didcrecently in the nuclear field). 
Third·,  and  perhaps  more  difficult to  grasp,  we  need  to 
be\prepared to  re-examine  the  amount  and  scope  of proposals  in 
the: approximation  of  laws.  At  the  technical  level  this  is  very 
represents  intellectual 
difficult  - the work  involved  often  /  ,  years  of/investment  -
but  because  the  proposals  involved are  only  instrumental  to 
th~ objective of a  common  market,  and  our  conception  of what 
that is  chan-ges  over  time,  we  cannot  ignore  the  problem• 
As  the· conception of. _the  Community  and  the  role  of  the 
market within it changes  over,time we  should be  prepared 
to  reassess  the  means  by  which  we  seek to  achieve  our  goals. 
Tlierpoint  of departure  for  these ii cl~ar. 
The.Community  is,  in part,  a  recog.nition  that  the  economic 
ct:mdd.tions  of coexistence  i~ .the.  late twentieth  century  are 
sa:ch: that- the scope  and  effect of  dec  i-s ions  cannot  be  limited 
tOt a  na.rrow  national  area.  We  are  interdependent,  and  that 
innludes  the  world  outside  the  Com~unity as well  as  within. 
.J 
Indeed· we  work  for an  increasing  degree  of  complementarity  and 
common  decision  making  on  a  worldwide  scale.  Of  course,  the  greater· 
the  scale,  the greater the difficulties  involved  and  often  the 
gteater the  time  that decisions  can  take  to be  realised. 
But.  here  in Western  Europe  we  have  been  fortunate  and  intel.ligent 
enou-g)l.  to+wol1k out  procedures  and  machinery  for  taking 
dci:edsi.G:mss iil1~commmn" on  common  problems. 
/This,  I  believB, This,  I  believe,  is  a  relatively simple definition of  the 
basis  and  purpose  of  the  Community  which most  nearly  responds 
to  the pressing needs  of  today  and  which  corresponds  to the  reality 
and  rhythm  of  day-to-day  life of  those  who•.work  on  Community 
issues.  It is  a  way  of  taking decisions  at  a  level  which will 
both allow those  decisions  to  have.real effect  and  also  takes 
into account  the  genuine  interests  of all parties.  Many 
decisions  do  not  need  to  be  taken  at European  level.  Many,  I 
might  add,  do  not  need  to  be  taken at national  level  either.  The 
arguments  for  reducing  the  level  of decision-taking whenever 
possible  are  just. as  potent  as  those  for  raising it whenever 
necessary.  But  where  a  decision  does  need  to  be  taken  at  European 
level,  the  machinery  for  doing  so  exists  and  should be  used. 
If ones  looks  at  the  Community  in  this way,  as  the majority 
the  theory  of 
of Member  States  do,  sterile  a~guments about/federalism or 
confederalism  lose much  of their  relevance  and  also  fh.·e  very 
limited degree  of interest they  offer  t6 all but  the  constitutional 
.much 
lmvyers.  No  one  in Europe/ engages  any  longer  in  such  a  sterile 
•,, 
argument.  For  one  thing  our  common  interest  in dealing 
effectively with  the major  issue~ before  us  {s  too  great,  and 
if we  take tbe.principle  of dealing with  common  problems  in 
common  and  then  face  the  major  challenges  of  the  future  we  can 
out  of that process  forge  a  m~tual understanding  about  the sort 
of Community  we  want. 
I  turn  to  some  of these  major  issues.  It is  a  fact,  although 
it is  sometimes  forgotten,  that  the  Community  exists  just as 
much  for  the outside world  as  it does  for  us  who  live within 
it.  Indeed it has  become  something of  a  platitude that  the 
Community  looks  stronger  and  sometimes  more  imposing  to  those 
/outside it (  .,_ 
,_J 
outside it than  to  those within.  This  is  partly because  of  the 
way  the machinery  works,  and partly because  of  the  high 
expectations  held by  the  rest of  the world  about  the policy 
of this  relatively new  grouping  on  the  world  stage,  in  an  era 
when  the  standards ·of  international  conduct  are higher  and 
expected by  some  to  be  more  disinterested than  they  have  perhaps 
ever been.  It is  a  fact  that  foreign  countries  often negotiate 
their most  important  agreements  with  the  Community,  not with 
Member  States.  Last  autumn  the  Community  conducted  a  series  of 
negotiations  with  over  thirty foreign  countries  about  textiles, 
in which t.he.Nine  ~ecessarily maintained  a  common  position.  The 
results were  undoubtedly  more  satisfactory for  the  Community 
than if Member  States had  negotiated separately.  We  are  at present 
engaged  on  similar crucial  talks with steel-producing countries. 
Next  week,  the  new  commeiciai  agreement  between  the  Community 
and  China will be  signed.  Thes-e  are  the  most  striking recent 
examples  of  the  Community's  activities  in  external  relations, 
but  the  work  of negotiation with  foreign  countries  on  matters 
of commercial  policy is  going on all the  time. 
;•· ... 
The  ability of  the  Nine- to  act  together  in negotiations 
with  foreign  countries  leads  those  countries  to  expect  from 
the  Community  a  similarly coherent  stand  on  the major  questions 
of international  economics  and  politi~s which  confront  the 
world at  the present  time.  I  am  thinking  in particular of 
attitudes  towards  the  gulf between  developed  and  developing 
countries,  the  so-called new  inter~ational economic  order, 
the  financing  of world trade,  aid  to  the  developing world  and 
human  rights.  World  politics are  becoming  the affair, 
certainly not  of nation states,  nor  even  of power  blocs,  but 
of interest groupings  on  a  continental  or  even  transcontinental 
/scale scale.  The  European  Community  is  one  of these  groupings, 
and  one  of the  most  powerful.  We  account,  for  example,  for 
40%  of the world's  trade.  A common  attitude is  expected  from 
us.  To  a  large  extent we  satisfy these  expectations.  The  role 
the  Communities  played  in  the  North-~outh dialogue  in Paris 
last  summer,  for  example,  was  an  important  and  constructive  one,  and 
it is  being  continued  in  the  follow  up  to  the  Paris  Conference. 
The  net  effect of all this activity is  to  give  foreign 
countries  a  much  clearer  impression  of the  Community's 
personality  than  exists within  the  Community  itself.  But 
this imbalance  between  the  Community's  external  appearance  and 
power  and  internal  cohesion  presents  a  danger  in  the  long  run. 
If we  arouse  expectations  in  foreign  countries which  we 
are not  able  to satisfy,  the  loss  of. credibility will  be  damaging 
not  only  for  the  Community  but  for  each  of  the Member  States. 
We  must.therefore  try  to  construct policies  internally which 
will give  weight  to  our  ~xternal positi0n;  not  of course  just 
for  the  sake  of having  a  policy,  but  in  response  to  a  real 
need  both  in  the  Community  and  in  the ··world  around us.  In  this 
small  corner  of .the  Western:world  over  260  million people  are, 
despite  their cultural diversity  and  separate historic 
traditions,  in  the  same  political  and  economic  boat.  And  it 
is  leaking.  It is  the  second major  issue  we  face. 
The  Commission  has  posed  this  economic  challenge  to Europe 
in  terms  of  the need  to  make  faster progress  towards  the 
to 
qualitative  leap which  will  t:ake  ·the  Community/ an  economic  and 
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union  rest  firmly  on  the/needS  of  the  Community. 
/Unemployment  in  the lln.employmre,nt  in  the  Community  stands  at  6l  million.  Between 
-now  an:d  19"85  another  9  million young  people will  join the 
labour market  for  jobs.  Inflation remains  a  present  danger 
and  a  threat  for  the  future.  In  these  circumstances  the  failure 
to  achieve  a  further  surge  of  economic  growth  could quite 
quickly  undermine  our  confidence  and  social balance.  The 
European  e~onomy therefore needs  a  stimulus  on  an  historic 
:scale  far .:greater  than  the partial measures  which national 
government5  are  proposing  or  can put  into effect.  It needs 
a  stimulus  on  the  scale  of  the  onset  of  the  railway  age  in the 
ninet-eenth  century,  or  the·spread to  the  mass  of the 
population  of what  were  previously middle-class  living 
.standards  in the  1960s. 
It ha?,in my  view  Eortunately,  become  less  fashionable 
to believe that  such  deep-rooted problems  can  be  satisfactorily 
resolved by  simply  pushing  the  strongest  economies  into  a 
fas·ter  reflation than  they  judge  appropriate.  Of  course  there 
JRU:St  be  some  short-term stimulus  but  in its more  extreme  form 
,··~. 
the  so--called  "locomotive"  theory  -:  with  the  most  pm<lerful 
·engin·e  pulling the  rest  out·' of  and  clear of  the station  -
lacks  persuasiveness.  If we  are  to  have  such metaphors  I 
would prefer that  of  a  number  of trains  pulling out  together. 
Of  course  some  will  be  bigger  and  more  powerful  than  others, 
but if they  can  begin  to  move  at  the  same  time  on  parallel 
tTacks t.he:,process  o~ mutual  support  could  keep  them all going. 
I  may  add  that,  in these  circumstances,.they need  a  good 
co'ordinated signalling system.  There  are  various  ways  in which 
the preparations  for thts. departure  can  be  made  - some  of  them 
have  been set:  out:  .in  the  Commission's  recent  propos:1ls  to  the 
Council - bot  I  ~believe that  the  time  is  ripe  now  for  a  much 
/clOS6I closer examination  of  common  guidelines  for  monetary  policy  in 
the Member  States.  The  more  we  think  in  these  terms  the  more 
effective will be  our  capacity  to  make  the  necessary 
transition to  a  full monetary  union. 
But  in addition  to  this  internal  role,  economic  and 
monetary  union would  have  an  important effect  on  the  outside 
world.  One  oLthe most  serious  obstacles  today  to  the 
continued free  flow  and  growth  of trade  is  the  lack of a 
of  exchange. 
stable  1nterna~ional medium/  For  two  decades  the dollar 
performed this function,  and  performed it well.  We  were  all 
more  prosperous  and  secure  than  we  had  ever  been  before. 
It still plays  a  vital role.  But  a  common  European  currency, 
with  the  economic  weight  of  the  Members  of  the  Community  behind it, 
and  the  wide  circulation-made possible  by  the  fact  that  the 
Community  is the~world 's  bigge,st  trading bloc,  would  be  not:.only 
a  factor  of stability in world  trade,  but  a  stimulus  to  growth, 
from  which  we  should  all profit.  A European  currency would 
not  replace  the  dollar  as  an  international currency,  but it would 
,,  ~. 
be  a  sound alternative  to it;  by  relieving  some  of  the  pressure 
on  the dollar would  itself h~lp ~o strengthen  that  currency. 
There  is  another  reason  for  a  firm  commitment  now  to  work 
towards  economic  and monetary  union.  I  -said earlier that  the 
Community  was  a  po-litical  organism  in  a  stage  of continuing 
development.  The  Community  cannot  stand still;  it must  either 
go  forward  or  go  back.  The  common  policies which  have  been 
achieved  over more  than  twenty years  are  not  in  danger  of 
disintergrating but  of being  overtaken  by  events.  If we 
failed to adapt  to  t·ha t  process  we  should  lose  the mutual 
strength we  have  gained.  The  prospect  of such  a  quiet  retreat 
/may  be may  be  a  heartening  one  for  some  of  the more 
prejudiced ·opponents  of  the  Community.  But  I  do  not  find it 
a  cheering prospect,  nor  can  anyone  who  truly has  the  interests 
of the  Community,  or  of his  own  country,  at  ~eart. And  we  may 
'-' 
also  ask ourselves  whether  a  Community  in regression presents 
an  encouraging picture  to other countires;  whether,  indeed, 
the  sort of  joining. 
it is I  Community.which  other countries  are  looking  forward  to/ 
The  answer  to  that,  as  we  approach  the  second  enlargement 
..;£  the  Community, is  .. clearly  no..  Greece,  Portugal 
eager 
and  Spain  are· n_ws t  1 to  become  members.  They  wa"nt  to  join 
a  vigorous  Community,  not  a  declining  one.  After  the  initial 
favourable  response  from  the  Nine  it was  recognised that  there 
complicated 
would be  long  and  I  negotiations  about  the  accession 
arrangements.  These  are  now  taking place.  The  negotiations 
with  Greece  are  in their substantial phase,  and  their main 
weight  should have  passed. by  the  end  of  the year.  The  procedure 
for  the  admission  of Portugal  and  Spain  is under way. 
There  are,  of course,  difficult-problems  to  be  solved 
in the  course  of all  three  n~gotiations.  But  these problems, 
and  the solutions  that must  be  found;  should  in  our mutual 
interest be  made  a  source  of _strength  for  the  Community,  not 
a ·source  of wea·kness.  A weakening  of  the  Community  through 
enlargement  cannot  be  acceptable  to  the  present members. 
What  is more,  it would  not  be  acceptable  td the  applicants. 
That  is not  the  Community  they  wish  to  join.  We  in Britain,  at 
least, with  a  long  history  of parliamentary  democracy  and  a 
determined if only erratically successful pursuit of 
economic  success,  should fully  accept  that premise. 
/The  move The  move  towards  enlargement  is  linked to  our  approach 
to economic  and  monetary  union.  What  would  clearly be  unacceptable 
in  any  such desirable move  is  that  only  the strong  should 
benefit  and  the  weak  should  go  further  to  the wall.  This 
need  not  and must  not  be  the  result~  There  is  as  much  mutual 
need  between  the  strong  and  the weak  in  Europe  as  there  was 
between  the states  of  the  American  Union  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
the  unity of  the 
The  strong need  the  underpinning  ~f t  Community  market. 
The  weak  need  the  commitment  to  monetary  discipline  and  the  benefit 
in  resource  transfers  that  a  powerful  market,  socially 
oriented,  can provide. 
These  major  issues  which  I  have  put  forward  this  evening  -
the  balance  between  our external  strength and  internal 
weakness.,_and  the  pressi.ng  need  for  a  new  stimulus  to  our  economies, 
especially as  we  move  towards  a  new  enlargement  of  the  Community  -
are  those  which  both  in their political challenge  and  diversity 
of detail should dominate  European  discussion  in Member  States. 
They  are  linked the  one  to  the  other and it is  our perspective 
of such major  issues  that  should  mould-~ur conception  of  the 
Community  as  an  organisation for-deliberately  acting  in  common 
in  our mutual  interest;  we  ought  to  eschew both  an  obsessive 
largely  between  illusory 
concentration  on  the/outdated  .debate/  federalism  and  the often/ 
national 
sovereignty of/institutions,  and  a  myopic  obsession with  alleged 
bureaucracy  and  standardisation. 
These  issues  can  outline  for  us  the  shape  of  the  Community 
of  tomorrow.  Their successful  handling  depends  primarily  on 
a  common  agreement  to  acts  of political will  not  bureaucratic 
/work  - although work  - although  the  latter must  necessarily  follow.  We  must  have 
a  determination,  first  to sustain and  enhance  our  external 
strength  in the world;  second  to  face  and  meet  the  challenge 
of continued  economic weakness;  third to  accept  the  fact  of  a 
second  enlargement  and  turn it to  the  strength of Europe,  not 
to its weakening.  Each  Member  State  stands  to  gain  in  this 
proces!=';  .none  should ntake  assumptions  or  beg  questions  about 
the  institutional direction  in which  these  changes will  take  us. 
We  should  be  ready  to  adapt  in  a  practical way,  and  a  Community 
of  twelve will  require  change.  The  Community  is  for  dealing 
with problems  which  can best be  dealt with by  us  all  ~ogether. 
The  framework  for  decision exists  and  where  it does  not 
it can  be  rapidly  created. 
There  is nothing  sophistical.  or  utopian  ..  about 
' 
such  an  approach  to  the  future  of  the  Community.  It simply 
calls  for  a  European  rather  than  a  national  reflex when  major 
issues  require  a  common  European  solution.  It puts  into 
perspectiva many  of  the petty  current~-.of criticism that all 
too  easily still circulate in Britain.  Agreement  on  such 
essentials will not  automatically  solve  all the  problems  we 
face,  but it will ensure  that  they  are  tackled  in mutual 
understanding  and  support. 
oooooOOOooooo 